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Abstract
We propose a simple theory of predatory pricing, based on scale economies and sequential
buyers (or markets). The entrant (or prey) needs to reach a critical scale to be successful. The
incumbent (or predator) is ready to make losses on earlier buyers so as to deprive the prey
of the scale it needs, thus making monopoly proﬁts on later buyers. Several extensions are
considered, including markets where scale economies exist because of demand externalities or
two-sided market eﬀects, and where markets are characterised by common costs. Conditions
under which predation may take place in actual cases are also discussed.
JEL Code: K21, L12, L40.
Keywords: Anticompetitive behaviour, exclusion, below-cost pricing, antitrust.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Existing models of predatory pricing rely on information asymmetries to explain why an incumbent
ﬁrm may have an incentive to prey upon rivals. In reputation, signalling, and ﬁnancial market
predation models,1 information asymmetries are required for predation to take place (for instance,
the entrant does not know the cost of the incumbent; or external ﬁnanciers do not observe the
behaviour of the entrant once it has obtained outside funds). In turn, this makes predation models
(relatively) sophisticated.2
In this paper, we present a simple theory of predation which does not depend on information
asymmetries, and which is based instead on the co-existence of scale economies and sequential
buyers (or markets). Intuitively, our mechanism works as follows. In an industry where there
exist scale economies (which can be either on the supply side or the demand side), the incumbent
engages in below-cost pricing to some early buyers (or markets) to deprive the entrant of key
proﬁts it would need to operate successfully, thereby deterring its entry into the industry. Once
secured those early buyers and pre-empted entry, the incumbent will be able to raise prices on the
remaining buyers (or markets), thereby recouping losses. The two usual ingredients of predation,
∗We are very grateful to Claudio Calcagno for excellent research assistance and for comments. We also thank
Patrick Rey and seminar participants at Università di Bologna, Univ. di Padova, European University Institute
(Florence), and Univ. Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona) for valuable suggestions.
†Università Bocconi, CSEF and CEPR
‡Università di Bologna and CEPR
1Kreps and Wilson (1982) are the main reference for reputation-based predation models. Milgrom and Roberts
(1982) explain predation through a signalling model, which has later been applied by Saloner (1987) to model
predation for takeovers, by Scharfstein to model test-market predation, and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) to show
how predation might limit the ability of a new entrant to infer about its proﬁtability. See Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990) for a theory which models predation in (imperfect) ﬁnancial markets, by putting on ﬁrmer grounds the
so-called ’long purse’ theory of predation.
2For a discussion on whether there are real-world cases which ﬁt the ’story’ described by such models, see Bolton,
Brodley and Riordan (2000, 2001) and Elzinga and Mills (2001).
1early sacriﬁce of proﬁts followed by later recoupment once the prey has exited, are therefore present
in our theory as well.
In our model, the incumbent may exclude an entrant even if the latter is more eﬃcient and if it
has the possibility to match the former’s oﬀers. When the incumbent and the entrant ’ﬁght’ to win
the early buyers, the entrant will beneﬁto fh i g h e rc o s te ﬃciency, but it will at most get duopoly
proﬁts on the later buyers, since the incumbent has already sunk its entry costs (or it has already
the minimum customer base needed to operate proﬁtably) and will therefore not exit the market.
Instead, the incumbent knows that by deterring early entry it will enjoy monopoly proﬁts in the
future, and this - other things being equal - prompts it to cut prices more on the earlier buyers
(or markets). As long as its eﬃciency disadvantage is not very large, the incumbent will be able
to successfully prey upon the rival. Otherwise, the early buyers will buy (at prices lower than the
incumbent’s marginal costs) from the entrant and predation will not succeed.
We intentionally keep our model as simple and parsimonious as possible, to highlight our
predation mechanism, discuss conditions under which it holds, and show that it can be applied to
several contexts. After presenting the basic model (Section 2), where scale economies take the form
of ﬁxed entry cost that the entrant needs to pay, we show in Section 3 that our predation results
are robust to a number of changes: predation may take the form of limiting the prey’s expansion,
rather than deterring its entry; it may deter entry in adjacent markets related by common costs;
it may occur in markets characterised by demand-side scale economies (consumers have network
externalities) or even in two-sided markets (one consumer group’s utility increases with the number
of consumers of the other side).
The predation mechanism we highlight seems to be present in a number of recent predation cases
that took place in Europe (in the US, after the 1993 Supreme Court judgment in Brooke Group and
the requirement that plaintiﬀs prove recoupment, there have been no successful predatory cases).
Let us brieﬂy review some of these cases.
In 2004 the Italian Antitrust Authority found that Telecom Italia, the public monopolist before
the liberalisation process, had abused a dominant position.3 Telecom Italia was found to set prices
in a selective and aggressive way and to engage into cross-subsidisation, with the aim of taking away
key customers from its rivals (internal documents showed Telecom Italia’s management was willing
t oi n c u rl o s s e si no r d e rt ow i n-o rw i nb a c k-i m p o rtant business customers), thereby hindering
their expansion.4 Among other episodes, it was found guilty of price abuses in the 2002 CONSIP
auction for supplying ﬁxed and mobile telephony services to the Italian Public Administrations.
The fact that ﬁrms competed in the pricing conditions to business customers and that formal
tender auctions existed, makes this market very similar to the one described in our base model,
which can be seen as a sequence of auctions.
In 2003 the European Commission adopted a decision against Wanadoo Interactive, a subsidiary
of France Télécom, for abuse of a dominant position in the form of predatory pricing in ADSL-
based Internet access services for the general public.5 The Commission found that Wanadoo’s retail
3Comportamenti abusivi di Telecom Italia. Decision No. 13752, 16 November 2004.
4For instance, at Para. 275, a cable rival, Fastweb, argues that Telecom Italia’s strategy aimed at eliminating
competitors’ incentives to invest in new and non-recoverable alternative telecom infrastructure, with the ultimate
eﬀect of inhibiting the development of competitors in the long-run.
5European Commission Decision COMP/38.233 of 16 July 2003. Upheld by the Court of First Instance in Case
2prices were well below average variable costs between March 2001 and August 2001 and that in
the subsequent period up to October 2002 they were approximately equivalent to average variable
costs, but signiﬁcantly below average total costs. As a result, Wanadoo’s market share grew from
46% to 72%, while its main competitor’s market share fell considerably, one ADSL service provider
(Mangoosta) went out of business, and no competitor had more than 10% of the market.
Paras. 351-352 of the Wanadoo Decision describe a setting which emphasises the importance
of incumbency advantages and scale economies, making it close to the mechanism pinned down in
our paper, and perhaps especially so to the network externality version of the model (see Section
3.3):
"[...] Service providers must, during this high-speed market development phase,
build an image as the default supplier of a product viewed by the consumer as techni-
cally sophisticated and become large enough to beneﬁt from economies of scale.
In this process, the chronological sequence of entry into the market is far from neu-
tral. Clearly, a service provider that has a considerable head start over its competitors
during the initial phase of market growth is able to capitalise on the momentum thus
gained. By contrast, laggards must make a much bigger eﬀort to acquire customers
if they wish to make up for lost time and bridge the resulting image gap and confer
on their high-speed service the same notoriety as that of the dominant undertaking’s
ﬂagship oﬀering. In these circumstances, new competitors are confronted with the need
not only to carry out the expenditure technically necessary in order to provide the ser-
vice but also to undertake substantial advertising and promotional expenditure both
to raise their product’s proﬁle and to undermine loyalty to the dominant undertaking’s
brand."
In November 2008 the UK Oﬃce of Fair Trading (OFT) found that Cardiﬀ Bus had infringed
Chapter II of the UK Competition Act 1998 by engaging in predatory conduct during the period
from 19 April 2004 to 18 February 2005.6 In response to 2 Travel’s entry into the market with a
new no-frills bus service, Cardiﬀ Bus introduced its own no-frills bus service (the ’white service’),
running on the same routes and at similar times of day as 2 Travel’s services. The white services
were run at a loss until shortly after 2 Travel’s exit, when Cardiﬀ Bus discontinued them. In this
case as well, scale economies were important both at the level of single routes and at the level of
developing the bus network. While Cardiﬀ Bus was the (dominant) incumbent and had already
developed a strong network, other bus companies would have had to incur substantial costs to
develop it.
In 2001 the OFT found that Napp, a pharmaceutical company, had contravened Chapter II of
the UK Competition Act 1998 through its behaviour in the market for the supply and distribution
of sustained release morphine in the United Kingdom. This infringement involved both a charge of
predatory pricing in the hospital segment and one of excessive pricing in the community segment
(Napp had a market share well in excess of 90% in both segments). While at ﬁrst sight it may
appear odd that Napp could engage in too low prices in a market segment and too high prices in
T-340/03 of 30 January 2007.
6Decision of the Oﬃce of Fair Trading No. CA98/01/2008 of 18 November 2008.
3another market segment, our mechanism ﬁts this case very well. Sustained release morphine was
sold to two completely diﬀerent groups of buyers. One group is represented by hospitals, which
have a high demand elasticity (pharmaceuticals have to be paid out of their budget) and can
count on the advice of specialist doctors for an assessment of the competing products. The other
group is represented by the so-called ’community segment’, where buyers are general practitioners
(GPs) who prescribe products for their patients (with the National Health Service paying the bills),
and who - not being experts - tend to choose those products which have already been chosen by
hospitals. This can be seen as an asymmetric two-sided market, where hospitals mostly care about
the prices (and do not care about choices made by GPs), while the demand of the community
segment strongly depends on the choices made by hospitals. As we shall show in Section 3.4, an
incumbent like Napp may want to sell below costs to the crucial side of the market (the hospital
market in this case) to make sure the rival does not win it, thereby deterring buyers on the other
side of the market (in this case, the community segment) - whose demand is characterised by a
positive externality with that of the former side - from buying from the entrant. As a result, they
will be obliged to buy from the incumbent, which can behave like a monopolist on this (community)
side of the market, recouping any losses made to win the other (hospital) side.
In a 2002 case, the OFT found that Aberdeen Journals adopted predatory behaviour in the
pricing of advertising space in its Aberdeen Herald & Post newspaper.7 This practice was aimed at
driving the Aberdeen & District Independent newspaper (its only competitor) out of the market.
Aberdeen Journals was found dominant in the market for the supply of advertising space in local
newspapers (paid-for and free) within the Aberdeen area. In this case as well limiting the scale
of operations of the prey appears to have a crucial role. The OFT acknowledged that while the
costs of launching a local free newspaper are relatively low, the cost of sustaining and expanding
presence is higher (the costs of establishing a distribution network are also high). Entrants typically
incur losses in the ﬁrst years until suﬃcient levels of credibility and acceptability by advertisers are
reached. By taking readers away from a rival, an incumbent newspaper reduces the rival’s demand
for advertising space, undermining its operations.
Finally, in 2001, the European Commission found that Deutsche Post (DPAG) had abused a
dominant position in the market of mail order parcel services.8 The Commission argues that by
making use of predatory pricing and ﬁdelity rebates, DPAG tried to prevent competitors in the
mail-order service from developing the infrastructure needed to compete successfully. The idea
that the incumbent’s pricing policy aimed at depriving the rivals of economies of scale and scope
emerges clearly from the following quote (where ’cooperation partners’ are customers with very
large orders):
"Contrary to what DPAG maintains, all of the disputed ﬁdelity rebates are likely to have
an eﬀect on the opportunities that other suppliers of mail-order parcel services have to
compete. Successful entry into the mail-order parcel services market requires a certain
critical mass of activity (some 100 million parcels or catalogues) and hence the parcel
7Decision of the Director General of Fair Trading No. CA98/14/2002 of 16 September 2002. Upheld by Compe-
tition Appeal Tribunal in Case No. 1009/1/1/02 of 23 June 2003.
8European Commission Decision COMP/35.141 of 20 March 2001 ("Deutsche Post"). Published in the Oﬃcial
Journal of the European Communities, OJ L 125/27 of 5 May 2001.
4volumes of at least two cooperation partners in this ﬁeld. By granting ﬁdelity rebates
to its biggest partners, DPAG has deliberately prevented competitors from reaching
the ‘critical mass’ of some 100 million in annual turnover. This ﬁdelity rebating policy
was, in precisely the period in which DPAG failed to cover its service-speciﬁc additional
costs (1990 to 1995), a decisive factor in ensuring that the ‘tying eﬀect’ of the ﬁdelity
rebates for mail-order parcel services maintained an ineﬃcient supply structure [...]."
(Deutsche Post, para. 37)
In Section 3.2 we formalise a predation model which ﬁts the facts of the Deutsche Post case.
Let us close the introduction with a note on the related literature. Obviously, our paper
belongs to the literature on predatory pricing we have referred to above. However, the mechanism
we propose is a new one, which may help rationalise predation in particular cases where previous
theories of predation may not apply. In other cases, however, our mechanism might well co-exist
with other rationales for predation. For instance, an incumbent may prey upon a rival in the initial
stages of a market, both as an attempt to deprive it of key proﬁts (and thus to prevent it from
enjoying scale economies), and as a way to signal that it would behave aggressively in the future
- consistent with what suggested by incomplete information models. Further, our mechanism is
consistent with Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)’s ﬁnancial market predation model: predation, by
denying proﬁts to the rival, also reduces the assets available to it, and therefore limits its possibility
to obtain outside funding.
Our paper is also closely related to the more general literature on exclusion and, in particular, to
the principle established by Bernheim and Whinston (1998) where ineﬃcient exclusion arises due to
t h ee x i s t e n c eo fcontracting externalities that agents fail to internalise. In our case, the agents who
take their decisions in the early periods (the incumbent, the entrant and the early buyers) do not
internalise the payoﬀ of subsequent buyers, thereby ﬁnding it jointly proﬁtable to exclude the more
eﬃcient entrant, even though exclusion reduces total welfare. Contracting externalities are also at
the basis of exclusion in Segal and Whinston (2000) where, under the presence of multiple buyers
and supply-side economies of scale, the incumbent uses exclusive dealing contracts to deter eﬃcient
entry. An important diﬀerence, though, is that - in addition to the incumbency advantage which
exists in our paper as well - in Segal and Whinston (2000) the incumbent also enjoys a ﬁrst-mover
advantage (i.e., it can make oﬀers to buyers before the entrant could materialize and make counter-
oﬀers), which facilitates exclusion. Indeed, in the case where buyers are approached sequentially,
where the timing of the game is the closest to our model, entry deterrence does not require any
sacriﬁce of proﬁts by the incumbent. More generally, our paper is also related to models where
exclusion occurs due to discriminatory oﬀers. In this perspective, the main reference is probably
Innes and Sexton (1994)’s "divide and conquer" strategy, a more recent paper being Karlinger and
Motta (2007). Finally, the fact that exclusion takes place by depriving the entrant, in early periods,
of proﬁts it needs to operate successfully in the long run makes our exclusionary mechanism close
also to Carlton and Waldman (2002)’s paper on exclusionary tying in complementary markets.
52 A simple model
In this Section, we introduce our basic model with supply-side scale economies, solve it, and brieﬂy
discuss the results, especially underlining the role of some of the assumptions made.
There are 2 buyers, 1 and 2, with unit demand and valuation  =1for a homogeneous
product. The extension to  buyers would not create any conceptual diﬃculty and would leave
qualitative results unchanged. While we assume here that both buyers are necessary for entry to
be proﬁtable, in the extension to  buyers we would limit ourselves to assume that one buyer is
not enough to attract entry. The assumption of inelastic demand is also done for simplicity: the
main diﬀerence is that by assuming elastic demands exclusion would entail not only a productive
ineﬃciency but also an allocative ineﬃciency.9
An incumbent ﬁrm, , has already sunk its entry costs, and a potential entrant, , is considering
entry.
Firm  is more cost-eﬃcient than ﬁrm , as marginal costs are respectively given by  =0
  12, but ﬁrm  still needs to pay its entry cost, .W ea s s u m et h a t :
 2 (A1)
which ensures that there are scale economies: by selling at the Bertrand equilibrium price, the
entrant would be able to operate proﬁtably if it sold to both buyers, but not if it sold to only one.
Furthermore, 2 implies that entry would be socially eﬃcient (there are higher costs when
the Incumbent serves the buyers than when the Entrant does).
2.1 The game
1. First period.
(a) Firms  simultaneously set prices 1
 and 1
to buyer 1.
(b) Buyer 1 decides from whom to buy and commits to her choice.
(c) Firm  decides whether to enter (and pay )o rn o t .
(d) Transactions take place. If  got the order from buyer 1 but did not enter, buyer 1
purchases from  at the oﬀered price 1
10
2. Second period.
(a) Firms simultaneously set prices 2
 and 2
 to buyer 2.
(b) Buyer 2 decides from whom to buy and commits to her choice.
( c )I fi th a sn o te n t e r e dy e t ,ﬁrm  decides whether to enter (and pay )o rn o t . 11
9Fumagalli and Motta (2008) analyse the model under  buyers and elastic demands, but considers a simultaneous
game and uniform pricing, rather than a sequential one (with possible intertemporal price discrimination) as in this
paper.
10The results would not change if we assumed that the buyer whose order remains unfulﬁlled is forced to buy
from the incumbent which would then charge the monopoly price.
11Allowing the entrant to enter also at the end of the second period only aﬀects the ’maximum’ price that ﬁrm 
could charge to the second buyer after it has already served the ﬁrst buyer. Allowing for a second chance of entry
implies that instead of charging price  =1, the incumbent will charge the ’limit price’  =  (if the price was
6(d) Transactions take place. If  got the order from buyer 2 but did not entered, buyer 2
purchases from  at the oﬀered price 2

This game has the following equilibria.
Proposition 1 (Sequential - and discriminatory - oﬀers) Equilibria of this game are as follows:
• (Exclusion) If 32 ≡ e  then ﬁrm  and  set 1
1 = 1
 =  −   ,b u y e r1 buys
from ,e n t r yi nt h eﬁrst period does not occur, ﬁrm  and  set the price 2
 = 2
 =  the
second buyer buys from  and entry in the second period does not occur.
• (Entry) If  ≤ e  then ﬁrm  and  set 1
 = 1
 =2  −  ,b u y e r1 buys from ,
entry occurs, ﬁrm  and  set 2
 = 2
 =  w i t ht h es e c o n db u y e rb u y i n gf r o m.
Proof. Let us move by backward induction. In the second period, if entry occurred in period
1, then standard Bertrand competition between cost-asymmetric ﬁrms takes place and the more
eﬃcient entrant obtains the second buyer at the price 2
 =  (now and in the rest of the paper
we disregard equilibria in weakly dominated strategies). If instead entry did not occur in period 1,
then ﬁrm  has still to pay the entry cost when it competes for the second buyer. It follows that
the entrant’s unit cost to serve 2 is equal to  while the incumbent’s unit cost amounts to  
by assumption 1 Hence, in this case it is the incumbent the low-cost supplier. In equilibrium
the incumbent serves the second buyer at the price 2
 =  = 2
 and entry does not occur in the
second period either.
In the ﬁrst period, given the price oﬀers and the decision of the ﬁrst buyer, ﬁrm  decides
whether to enter the market. If 1 decided to buy from ﬁrm  entry is proﬁt a b l ea sl o n ga sr e n t s
collected in the ﬁrst period, together with the ones that it anticipates to obtain in the second one
are larger than , i.e. (1
)=1
 +  −  ≥ 0. This inequality identiﬁes the minimum price at
which ﬁrm  is willing to supply 1 :
e 1
 =  −    (by assumption 1).
If instead 1 decided to buy from the incumbent, entry is not proﬁtable as ﬁrm  anticipates that
the second-period rents alone are insuﬃcient to cover the entry cost:   by assumption 1.
Lack of entry implies that the incumbent’s second-period proﬁts amount to  − , and that the
incumbent’s total proﬁts are equal to (1
)=1
 − + − Then, the minimum price at which
the incumbent is willing to supply 1 is:
e 1
 =2  −   (by assumption 1)
The comparison between e 1
 and e 1
 reveals that
e 1
 ≥ e 1




higher, the entrant would undercut the incumbent and enter). Note that by assuming that entry is possible also at
t h es e c o n dp e r i o dw em a k ei tm o r ed i ﬃcult for exclusion to take place, since after having deterred entry in the ﬁrst
period, the incumbent is not able to make the monopoly price 1 but only the lower price .
7Diﬀerently stated, competition for the ﬁrst buyer is like an asymmetric Bertrand case where the
incumbent and the entrant have respectively costs 2 − and  − The following situations can
then arise:
(i) (Exclusion) If e  the equilibrium is such that 1
 = 1
 =  −  1 buys from the
incumbent and entry does not occur. By the deﬁnition of e  the entrant has no incentive to
undercut.
(ii) (Entry)I f ≤ e  the equilibrium is such that 1
 = 1
 =2  − 1 buys from the entrant
and entry occurs in the ﬁrst period. By the deﬁnition of e  the incumbent has no incentive to
undercut.
Proposition 1 shows that - if the incumbent is not too ineﬃcient relative to the entrant, or
equivalently if the entrant has ﬁxed costs which are not too low - the game admits a unique
equilibrium where exclusion of the (eﬃcient) entrant takes place due to a predatory strategy by
the incumbent. Indeed, the incumbent sets a price below its own costs of production in the ﬁrst
period of the game, therefore making losses, to increase its price in the second period, therefore
recouping its previous losses, when it knows that the prey will not be able to enter. The usual
ingredients for predation, namely early proﬁts a c r i ﬁce and subsequent recoupment, are thus present
in this simple model.
Note that the exclusionary equilibrium arises even though the incumbent does not enjoy a
ﬁrst-mover advantage and the more eﬃcient entrant can submit bids at the same time as the
incumbent. The sources of exclusion are: (i) the incumbency advantage enjoyed by ﬁrm  i.e. the
fact that the entrant has still to sink the ﬁxed cost  when oﬀers are made, while the incumbent
has already sunk it; (ii) the fact that the revenues earned in the second period alone are insuﬃcient
to cover such a cost ( by assumption 1). This implies that ﬁrm  will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to pay the entry cost unless ﬁrst-period revenues are large enough, which creates scope for the
incumbent to bid aggressively in the ﬁrst period and to oﬀer a price which is immune to the
entrant’s undercutting. Why bidding such a low price is instead proﬁt a b l ef o rt h ei n c u m b e n t ,
despite its variable cost disadvantage? The reason is that, by bidding aggressively in the ﬁrst
period, the incumbent removes competition from the entrant in the second period and will be able
to charge a high price to the second buyer. Instead, ﬁrm  will always face competition by the
incumbent in the second period, which limits the revenues that it can collect from the second buyer.
If the eﬃciency gap between the incumbent and the entrant is not too large (or if the entry cost 
is not too low), such asymmetry in favour of the incumbent is strong enough to enable recoupment
and to cause exclusion.12
If instead ﬁrm  could sink the entry cost before bids to the ﬁrst buyer are made, then the
incumbency advantage of ﬁrm  would be eliminated, and the unique equilibrium would be one
with  serving both buyers.
Which markets ﬁtt h i sm o d e l ? The base model presented in this Section resembles mar-
kets where buyers decide on the basis of tender oﬀers (such as public procurement markets), or
12If the incumbent also enjoys a ﬁrst-mover advantage exclusion will be easier. This is because the incumbent can
take actions to attract the early buyer before the entrant can react, and can therefore exploit in the most proﬁtable
way the negative externality that the ﬁrst buyer exerts on the other when it decides to buy from the incumbent.
8where buyers are large business customers which negotiate prices with their suppliers, and where
one or more ﬁrms have not had the time (or willingness) to develop their infrastructure or build
the necessary production or sales capacity (examples of sectors which immediately come to mind
are construction, transportation, telecommunications).
In the real world there may be situations where a precommitment to entry and building in-
frastructure is possible, and others where it would not. Think for instance of a situation where
it would take time to carry out certain investments to enter in a given sector or country (licenses
to be obtained, working permits, a large and complex infrastructure to be built, machines to be
bought, construction work to be carried out, and so on), so that the tender oﬀe r sh a v et ob em a d e
before (most of the) entry costs are sunk. In that case, the timing would be as in our base model,
and exclusion may take place. In other cases, an entrant may instead be able to sink its entry costs
before competing for buyers: exclusion would then be unlikely in our base model with supply-side
scale economies. Note, further, that a simple announcement is not enough: a credible commitment
to enter, with corresponding sunk costs being paid, is necessary to persuade buyers that entry is
irreversible.
While in our base model a precommitment to enter would rule out predation, we show in
Sections 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4 below that the same mechanism based may lead to predation also in cases
(where the entrant does not have excess capacity, or where scale economies are created by demand
externalities) where the entrant is already in the market.
Note also that strategic behaviour by the buyers would not necessarily prevent predation. For
instance, one might think that the ﬁrst buyer might delay its purchase decision so as to allow entry.
In fact, there is no incentive for her to do so because buying ﬁrst guarantees prices strictly below
 while by delaying purchases she would get the price .
2.2 Comments
In this Section, we discuss which assumptions behind the model and its timing drive the predation
result. We also study welfare eﬀects.
2.2.1 Renegotiation (or breach of orders)
The existence of the predatory equilibrium relies on the assumption that buyers cannot modify
their orders after the entry decision. Suppose instead that buyers could breach their initial decision
and change supplier. Also, imagine that in the ﬁrst period entry takes place even if the ﬁrst buyer
chose the incumbent. Then 1,  and  w o u l dh a v ea ni n c e n t i v et oﬁnd an agreement that allows
ﬁrm  to supply the ﬁrst buyer: due to the entrant’s higher productive eﬃciency the joint welfare of
the three agents in such a case is larger relative to the case where the incumbent is the supplier, and
they all can (weakly) improve their situation as compared with that case. Anticipating this, ﬁrm 
might have an incentive to sink the ﬁxed cost even though the ﬁrst buyer chose the incumbent (more
precisely, this incentive exists if ﬁrm  expects to extract enough surplus from the renegotiation).
In turn, the incumbent loses the incentive to undercut any price equal or below  since subsequent
entry removes the possibility to recoup by charging a high price to the second buyer.
This implies that in contexts where renegotiation of contracts is possible and cheap, exclusion
would be less likely to take place. In other contexts, particularly in industries where buyers are
9smaller and less concentrated, there may be important transaction costs involved for breaching
orders, resulting in exclusion to be more likely.
Finally, note that absence of renegotiation is a crucial assumption for exclusion in models where
scale economies are on the supply-side, as in the base model analysed in this Section. However, we
shall see in Section 3.3 below that when scale economies are due to network eﬀects, the possibility
of breaching orders does not eliminate the potential for exclusion.
2.2.2 Intertemporal discriminatory pricing v. uniform pricing
We have assumed that buyers can be charged diﬀerent prices across periods, thus allowing for
intertemporal price discrimination. If ﬁrms were instead obliged to charge the same price to each
buyer, then predation will never occur. Intuitively, the incumbent has an incentive to make losses
on earlier buyers only if it can recoup them on later buyers, after it is clear that the prey will not
be able to enter. Under intertemporal uniform pricing, this predatory strategy is not possible: if
the incumbent wanted to cut prices, it would have to do so for all buyers, thus implying that it
would never want to sell below cost. The following Lemma proves this point.
Lemma 1 (Sequential - but uniform - prices). For all parameter values, ﬁrm  and  set  =
 = , both buyers buy from ,a n de n t r yw i l lo c c u r .
Proof. Let us move by backward induction. At the last stage, the second buyer will face the
same prices ,  paid by the ﬁrst buyer. The second buyer will buy from  only if  ≤  or
if    but ﬁrm  did not enter in the ﬁrst period and  .T h eﬁrst buyer will buy from
 only if  ≤  or if    b u ti ta n t i c i p a t e st h a tﬁrm  will not make suﬃcient proﬁts to
cover its costs, that is, if 2 (recall that the price for the second buyer coincides with the
one oﬀered to the ﬁrst buyer). Note however that, by assumption 1, 2. Hence equilibria
exhibiting exclusion should be such that the incumbent oﬀers a price  below cost to both buyers,
which is unproﬁtable. The ﬁrms will therefore play the standard Bertrand game and  =  = 
is the equilibrium of the game (we disregard weakly dominated strategies.)
2.2.3 Price Commitment
If the game was modiﬁed so that ﬁrst ﬁrms bid simultaneously for both buyers and then buyers
choose the supplier sequentially, exclusion cannot arise.13 Indeed, the fact that prices for both
buyers are set simultaneously expands the scope for proﬁtable deviations as compared with the
case of sequential bids. Then, whenever the incumbent bids a pair of prices such that 1
 +2
 
the entrant has an incentive to slightly undercut both prices: this would attract both buyers and
would make entry proﬁtable. In order to block the entrant’s deviations the incumbent should bid
a pair of prices such that 1
 +2
 ≤  but such an oﬀer would not be proﬁtable for the incumbent
either. For a similar reason, however, entry equilibria exhibit prices below  for both buyers
(namely, 1
 = 2
 =2  −  ), as both prices must be immune to the incumbent’s deviation
of undercutting on one buyer and recouping on the other.
13If buyers’ decisions were also simultaneous, then exclusion might arise because of miscoordination failure. See
for instance Fumagalli and Motta (2008).
102.2.4 Downstream competition
We have assumed so far that buyers are ﬁnal consumers. This is not necessarily an innocent
assumption in exclusionary models, as showed by Fumagalli and Motta (2006, 2008). When buyers
are retailers who are competing for consumers, we cannot assume any longer that the number of
units they buy from their chosen supplier is ﬁxed. In particular, if the downstream markets
are integrated and retailers are perceived as homogeneous, the buyer-retailer who pays the lower
wholesale price will be able to win all the market demand. In turn, this means that even if the
ﬁrst buyer has committed to buy from the incumbent, the entrant may guarantee itself enough
scale if it induces the second buyer to buy from it. For this reason, when there exists suﬃciently
ﬁerce downstream competition predation will not occur. If, instead, buyers-retailers were highly
diﬀerentiated, or operated in diﬀerent markets (i.e., downstream competition would be weak or
absent), then the predation result would continue to hold (as long as  is high enough): each
retailer could bring only a share of the total market to the entrant, and if the incumbent managed
to win the ﬁrst buyer, the second buyer’s order would not be suﬃcient for the entrant to cover its
entry cost.
To formalise this situation, keep the same assumptions on parameters as in the base model,
but assume that in each market  =1 2 there is a mass of consumers normalised to 1 and with
unit valuation and demand for the product. Consider the following timing of the game.
In the ﬁrst period, ﬁrms  set wholesale prices 1
 and 1
 to retailer 1, who decides from
whom to buy (but does not commit on the size of the order). Firm  decides on entry.
In the second period, ﬁrms simultaneously set prices 2
 and 2
 to retailer 2, who decides from
whom to buy. If it has not entered yet, ﬁrm  decides whether to enter (and pay ) or not.
In the third period, retailers set prices 1 and 2. Consumers in each market decide. Transac-
tions take place.
In what follows, we limit ourselves to state the result for two extreme cases: (a) independent
markets: consumers in market  can buy only from retailer ; (b) perfect substitutes with Bertrand
competition: consumers can buy from each retailer.14 For intermediate competition cases, we
would expect that - as in Fumagalli and Motta (2008) - if there is suﬃciently ﬁerce competition
downstream, predation may not take place at equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Downstream competition) Suppose buyers are retailers who sell to ﬁnal con-
sumers. Equilibria of this game are as follows:
• (Independent market areas) If each retailer sells in a separate ﬁnal market of size 1
and with unit valuation, then the equilibria are the same as in the base model (in particular,
predation arises if 32 ≡ e ).
• (Fierce competition) If the two markets are integrated and retailers compete in prices
for ﬁnal customers, only the entry equilibrium exists, with wholesale prices 
 = 
 = 
( =1 2), each buyer-retailer buying from the entrant, and ﬁnal consumers paying .
14One can rationalise the two cases as due to transportation costs. If retailer  is located in market ,t h e
independent markets case corresponds to segmented geographical markets with arbitrarily large transportation
costs, the perfect competition case corresponds to integrated markets with zero transportation costs.
11Proof. (Independent market areas) If retailers are selling in independent markets, then each
retailer can sell at most one unit of the product. Hence, everything will be as in the base model
where buyers are ﬁnal consumers who buy at most one unit.
(Fierce competition) First, we show that this is an equilibrium,15 as there is no incentive to
deviate from it. At this equilibrium  would enter as  =2  − 0.I f ﬁrm  changed its
price(s) it could only reduce its proﬁts: if the price is increased to one buyer only,  would be at
best unchanged if the other buyer still buys from ; if the price is increased to both, buyers will
buy from  and  =0 .I f reduced its wholesale price to one or both buyers, it would still sell
both units but at lower proﬁts. If ﬁrm  undercuts to buyer  only (
   −
 = ), that
buyer would choose to buy from it and would have the lowest cost. Buyer  would then sell both
units, and  would have negative proﬁts. Note that a deviation with lower wholesale price to 
while increasing price to  would still give negative proﬁts to : all units would be sold by 
who pays 
  . Similarly, if undercutting took place on both buyers. Finally, buyers have no
incentive to deviate at the candidate equilibrium (which would be the standard Bertrand game
played downstream).
Next, we show that an exclusionary equilibrium does not exist. Suppose there is an equilibrium
where, similarly to the base model, ﬁrm  does not enter and 
  , 
−
  . Given competition
downstream, all units would be sold by buyer-retailer ,a n d =2 ( 
−)  0. More generally,
there cannot exist any exclusionary equilibrium where ﬁrm  charges 
   to at least one buyer.
Consider next a candidate equilibrium where  ≤ 
 ≤ −
 . This price pair would not survive
the deviation from ﬁrm , who would set 
 = 
 − , making  the lowest cost retailer: 
would buy from  and sell both units on the ﬁnal market, so that  =2 
 − ≥ 2 −0.
2.2.5 Consumer surplus and welfare
The case of (intertemporal) uniform pricing (see Section 2.2.2 above) provides us with the natural
benchmark for welfare analysis. Indeed, if the incumbent was not allowed to behave strategically
so as to deter entry, that is, if either (intertemporal) price discrimination was forbidden, or the
incumbent was not allowed to set below-cost pricing, the unique equilibrium would be the one
where entry would occur and both buyers would pay . Predation would clearly harm consumers,
as total consumer surplus under predation would be given by 2−(2 −)  2−2, which holds
for 32, the latter being precisely the condition under which predation takes place. The
predatory equilibrium is also welfare-inferior, as it entails a productive ineﬃciency. Due to inelastic
demands, the price level just determines the distribution of surplus between buyers and ﬁrms, but
not the overall level of surplus. But at the predatory equilibrium the cost of serving the buyers is
2, whereas at the entry equilibrium it is 2. Obviously, with any downward-sloping demand
function in addition to the productive ineﬃciency the exclusionary equilibrium would also entail a
deadweight loss.
Note, however, that welfare implications are more delicate than they may appear at ﬁrst sight.
Banning (intertemporal) price discrimination, or banning below-cost pricing by the incumbent
does not unambiguously increase welfare. In fact, it would reduce it if  ≤ 32 - that is when
entry takes place also when price discrimination is feasible - because it would chill competition
15More precisely, it is the unique entry equilibrium which survives the elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
12and (weakly) lead to higher price. Indeed, if  ≤ 32, the fact that the incumbent can price
aggressively under price discrimination will result in the ﬁrst buyer buying at prices below ,
and the second buyer at , while both would buy at  if the incumbent were prevented from
(intertemporal) price discriminating or from selling below cost. Since entry occurs anyhow, total
welfare would be equal under price discrimination and under uniform pricing, but this is just
because of inelastic demands. If we assumed elastic demands, welfare would also be higher under
price discrimination. The following Proposition summarises these results.
Proposition 3 Banning intertemporal price discrimination (or below-cost pricing) would have
ambiguous eﬀects:
• If  ≤ 32, it would decrease consumer surplus (leaving total welfare unchanged).
• If 32, it would increase consumer surplus and total welfare.
Proof. Follows from text above.
Measures aimed at discouraging price aggressiveness by dominant ﬁrms, for instance forbidding
them from discriminating across customers, or from selling below cost, would therefore result in a
trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, they would reduce the chances that anti-competitive exclusion would
take place; on the other hand, when the entrant is suﬃciently more eﬃcient than the incumbent,
exclusion would not occur and they would chill competition and result in higher prices.16
3E x t e n s i o n s
In this Section, we propose other settings where the same basic mechanism for predation, hinging
on scale economies and externalities among buyers, also applies. Section 3.1 looks at the case
where the entrant has already paid its set-up costs, but would need to make further investments
to increase its capacity; Section 3.2 analyses the case of products which develop over time, but
are related because of common costs; Section 3.3 deals with scale economies on the demand side,
created by the existence of network externalities; ﬁnally, Section 3.4 shows that predation may also
appear in two-sided markets.
3.1 Entry v. expansion (predation without exit of the prey)
So far, we have assumed that the incumbent ﬁr mc a np r e yu p o naﬁrm which has not started
production yet. In this Section, we show that predation might also occur in a market where the
’prey’ is already established, but needs to sink new costs if it wants to expand its scale of operation
(while the incumbent has already established larger capacity). In other words, predation may be
rational not only to deter entry, but also to relegate a smaller rival to a niche market, preventing
it from expanding its scale.
To formalise this idea, consider the following minor variation of the model analysed in Section
2, where ﬁrm  and ﬁrm  have  captive buyers each, i.e. buyers who already bought from
them in the past and do not want to change supplier. This might be because they have suﬃciently
16See Karlinger and Motta (2007) for similar conclusions in a model with (simultaneous) price discrimination and
network eﬀects.
13high switching costs or because they are located too far from the alternative supplier. In addition,
there are  buyers, 1 and 2, who have bought from  in the past but have zero switching
costs, and therefore are ready to buy from the supplier who oﬀers the better price (alternatively,
1 and 2 might be new buyers who materialize for the ﬁrst time and did not buy in the past).
All buyers have a valuation  =1for the (homogeneous) product.
Finally, assume that ﬁrm  has already incurred the costs 2 necessary to produce  units
of the product, while ﬁrm  has incurred only the ﬁxed cost  necessary to produce  units. As
usual, we assume that ﬁrm  is more cost-eﬃcient:  =0 .17 Also, non-captive buyers are
approached sequentially, with the same timing as in Section 2.18
It is easy to see that except that ﬁrms must establish also the price for captive buyers, the
game is the same as the sequential one analysed before. Then, it also admits the same equilibria
(and under the same conditions), with ’predation’ occurring or not depending on how large is the
ﬁxed cost  or the eﬃciency gap between the incumbent and ﬁrm .
However, there are two interesting features in this simple extension. First, here predation takes
place without ﬁrm  exiting the market: the prey will continue to operate and serve the captive
buyers, but predation relegates it to its niche market, that is, to its captive buyers. Firm 
would have had the opportunity to expand and serve the contestable buyers, but the incumbent’s
predatory strategy prevents it from expanding. This is important for policy implications: it is not
necessary that the prey exits the market for predation to take place.
Second, we observe here that in equilibrium there is more price discrimination than in the
previous model. We observe more extensive selective price cuts, with captive buyers ending up
paying the pure monopoly price  =1and being deprived of all their surplus, and buyers who
are contestable beneﬁting (relative to the captive buyers) in a diﬀerent measure: the ﬁrst free
buyer is always buying below , whereas the second buyer pays at or above , but never a higher
price than 1.
3.2 Predation in markets with common costs
The same logic described in the previous Sections applies when there are diﬀerent relevant (either
product or geographic) markets which are related by the existence of common costs. Suppose that
an incumbent ﬁrm is already active in all of them, but that the entrant needs time to enter some
of them. This may have been the case in some recently liberalised markets, such as postal services,
where new entry is allowed in some segments of the market (mail-order parcel services, business-
to-business mail), while the former public monopolist keeps a "reserved area" for some period after
liberalisation (exclusive rights to carry letters and items weighing less than 200 g);19 or it may be
the case where tariﬀs or other barriers to trade are being phased out, or where it would take a long
time to get all permits needed to operate locally, so that a new ﬁr mm i g h tb ea b l et oe n t e rs o m e
markets immediately, but will be able to enter a particular foreign market only in the future. The
novel insight is that - present economies of scope (in the postal service, common infrastructure, in
17Note that the larger capacity does not result in lower marginal costs, to maintain the usual assumption that
exclusion is ineﬃcient.
18Since there is no competition for captive buyers, it is irrelevant whether they are approached and decide before
o ra tt h es a m et i m ea sf r e eb u y e r s .
19See Deutsche Post AG, Commission Decision of 20 March 2001.
14the international markets example a common R&D or technology) - the incumbent may predate
in the markets which open ﬁrst, to preserve its monopoly position in all the markets.20
To formalize this situation let us assume that there are two markets denoted as  and ,w i t h
market  being the market which opens ﬁrst (in the postal service, market  is the market for
letters, market  that for mail-orders). There is independence on the demand side. There is one
consumer on market  and one in market , and each of them attaches a unit valuation to the
product. (Population size is normalised to 1 in each market.) Firm  is already established in
the industry and produces both products. Firm  can enter market  in both the ﬁrst and the
second period, but can enter market  only in the second period. There is a common ﬁxed cost of
entry, :o n c ep a i d for entering market ,aﬁrm does not need any other set-up costs. Firm 
is more eﬃcient than : in both markets, marginal costs are given by  =0   12. Finally,
we assume that
2 3 (2)
The game is as follows:
1. First period.






 to the buyers, who decide if
and from whom to buy.
(b) Firm  decides whether to enter market  (and pay ) or not.
(c) Transactions take place. If  got the order in market  but did not enter, the buyer












 to the buyers, who decide
if and from whom to buy.
(b) Firm  decides whether to enter in either market  or market  or both. If it has
not entered market  yet, by paying the cost  ﬁrm  can enter both markets. If it
has already entered market  it does not need to pay any additional set-up cost to
operate in market 
(c) Transactions take place. If  got orders in some market but did not enter that market,
the buyer purchases from  at the oﬀered price 
2
 with  = 
In what follows, we show that if the ﬁxed cost  is large enough there will be a predatory
equilibrium with deterred entry; otherwise, ﬁrm  will enter market  in the ﬁrst period, and
market  in the second. As in the model of Section 2, there is scope for predation because the
incumbent - but not ﬁrm  - has already sunk the common ﬁx e dc o s tw h e no ﬀers are made, and
because the second-period proﬁts alone are insuﬃcient for ﬁrm  to cover such cost.
20Also Carlton and Waldman (2002) shows that, in markets related by complementarity in consumption rather
than by the existence of common costs, the incumbent can deter entry in the market that open ﬁrst in order to
protect its monopoly position in all the markets where it operates. Note, however, that in the supply-side scale
economies version of their model, successful exclusion requires the incumbent to enjoy also a ﬁrst-mover advantage
and to adopt irreversible tying.
15Proposition 4 (Predation in sequential markets with common costs.) Equilibria of this game are
as follows:
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 = ,a n d supplies both markets.




 =  −2 
, 
1
 =1 , ﬁrm  supplies both markets and  does not enter . In the second period,








 =  − (with  ∈ [0]), and  supplies both
markets. Firm  does not enter any market.
Proof. By backward induction. Consider the second period ﬁrst. If  already entered market
 in period 1, then it does not have to incur any cost to enter market  Standard Bertrand
competition with cost-asymmetric ﬁrms takes place, and the more eﬃcient ﬁrm  supplies both




 = .I f did not enter  in period 1, then it has still to pay
the common entry cost when it competes with the incumbent in the second period. Since 2




 =  and
entry will not occur
Consider now the ﬁrst period. Since second-period rents alone are insuﬃcient to cover the
entry cost, in the ﬁrst period ﬁrm  ﬁnds it proﬁtable to pay  if the rents collected in market
 are large enough: 
1
 +2  −  ≥ 0 The minimum price that ﬁrm  is willing to oﬀer to
supply market  in the ﬁrst period is then: e 
1
 =  −2   (by assumption 2) In turn, the
incumbent’s minimum price is e 
1
 =3  −   because if it captures market  in the ﬁrst
period, it will dominate both markets in the second period (at a total price ), thereby making
proﬁts 
1
 −  +  − 2. It is easy to check that when  ≥ 52 it is the incumbent who is
willing to bid more aggressively for market  in the ﬁrst period. (Since there is no threat of entry
in market  in the ﬁrst period, the price established by the incumbent is 
1
 =1irrespective of
the outcome in market ).
The model presented here is consistent with the facts of an important EU predatory case,
Deutsche Post. Deutsche Post - which had exclusive rights on the market for letters and small
parcels, was found to have abused a dominant position by the use of predatory pricing and ﬁ-
delity rebates in the mail-order market. Although the European Commission does not spell any
theory of harm, one rationale for predation may have been that, given the existence of important
common costs with other postal services, mail-order operators could later start to compete with
other services of Deutsche Post. For instance, Hermes Versand Service, the parcel delivery service
subsidiary of a mail-order ﬁrm, was initially created for the mail-order trade’s own use, but its
infrastructure was later used to convey parcels for third parties and in 2000 became one of the
largest courier, express mail and parcels operator in Germany.21
21See Deutsche Post, at paragraph 38 and footnote 64.
163.3 Network eﬀects
One of the limitations of the exclusionary model analysed so far is that for predation to take place,
it is required that the entrant is not able to pre-commit to production (or additional capacity), or
does not have the time to sink its entry (or expansion) costs. In this Section, we show that under
demand-side scale economies, the entrant may have already sunk its cost (equivalently, one could
assume that there is no entry cost), but this is not suﬃcient to avoid exclusion. Indeed, as in the
previous Sections, it turns out that exclusion will be the only equilibrium if the incumbent does
not have a very strong marginal cost disadvantage vis-à-vis the entrant.
Consider the following model, which is a simpliﬁed (sequential) version of Karlinger and Motta
(2008). There are 2 new buyers, 1 and 2, who are considering to buy a product, and are
characterised by a utility  = () −  if they buy one unit of good  = ,w h e r e ∈ +
indicates the total number of buyers who buy the product in the present period, or have bought in
the past and still use it.22 There are direct network externalities in that (1) = 0 and ()  0 for
  1.W ea s s u m et h a t()=(+1) =  for any   1. In other words, there are demand-side
scale economies because a ﬁrm needs to have at least two consumers for them to reach a positive
utility from the network good, but as soon as there are two buyers, all economies are attained.
This is to keep the analysis as simple as possible, and to make exclusion more diﬃcult.23 The
incumbent ﬁrm  has already a customer base  ≥ 2 - the old buyers are not buying any longer,
but continue to use the network product - while the new ﬁrm  has no customer yet when the
game starts. Apart from possible diﬀerences in their sizes, the two networks are homogeneous but
incompatible.
Firm  is more cost-eﬃcient than ﬁrm : marginal costs are respectively given by 0= 
  .N o t et h a tt of o c u so nt h er o l eo fn e t w o r ke ﬀects, we assume away entry cost. Finally, we
do not impose restrictions on prices which can be also negative. The game is as follows.
1. First period.
(a) Firms  simultaneously set prices 1
 and 1
 to buyer 1.
(b) Buyer 1 d e c i d e sf r o mw h o mt ob u y .
2. Second period.
(a) Firms  simultaneously set prices 2
 and 2
 to buyer 2.
(b) Buyer 2 d e c i d e sf r o mw h o mt ob u y .
3. Third period
Consumption takes place and utilities are realized.
The following Proposition illustrates the results of the analysis.
22Here again, the extension to  buyers and the consideration of elastic demands would leave qualitative results
unchanged.
23By making the more general assumption that () is an increasing and concave function, results would not
qualitatively change, though. The simpler formulation we adopted has also the additional advantage that the utility
of customers who have bought in the past is not aﬀected by the outcome of the game, thus simplifying any welfare
analysis one might want to do.
17Proposition 5 (Network market, sequential - and intertemporal discriminatory - oﬀers) Equilib-
ria are as follows:
• (Entry) If  ≤ 3 then both buyers buy from  the ﬁrst paying a price 1
 =2  − 
the second paying a price 2
 = 
• (Exclusion) If 3 then both buyers buy from  the ﬁrst paying a price 1
 = − the
second paying a price 2
 = .
Proof. In the second period, competition for 2 results in diﬀerent outcomes depending on the
choice of the ﬁrst buyer. (i) If 1 bought from  the second buyer does the same if (and only
if) 2
 = (2) − 2
 ≥ ( +1 )− 2
 = 2
 Given that  ≥ 2 and (2) = ( +1 )=,t h e
ﬁrm setting the lowest price gets 2. Standard Bertrand competition with cost-asymmetric ﬁrms
takes place and ﬁrm  supplies the second buyer at a price 2
 =  (ii) If 1 bought from the
incumbent, the second buyer buys from ﬁrm  if (and only if) (1) − 2
 ≥ ( +2 )− 2
 Given
that (1) = 0 the second buyer buys from ﬁrm  iﬀ 2
 ≤ 2
 −  Lack of customer base implies
that, in order to capture 2 ﬁrm  cannot simply slightly undercut the incumbent, but it has to
grant a suﬃciently large discount. In equilibrium, the incumbent supplies 2 at a price 2
 = 
In the ﬁrst period, 1 anticipates that the supplier she chooses will serve also the second buyer.
Then, the critical size necessary to enjoy utility from the network product will be achieved whatever
her choice and 1 is willing to buy from the supplier oﬀering the lowest price. In turn, suppliers
anticipate that failing to serve the ﬁrst buyer implies failing to serve also the second, thereby losing
the proﬁts that can be extracted in the second period. Also, the incumbency advantage creates an
asymmetry between such proﬁts, with the incumbent earning  −  while the entrant earning 
Together with the diﬀerence in production costs, this generates asymmetric Bertrand competition
for the ﬁrst buyer, with the minimum prices at which the incumbent and ﬁrm  are willing to
supply 1 being equal, respectively, to
e 1
 =  − ( − )=2  −  
e 1
 =0 − 
The comparison between e 1
 and e 1
 determines who gets the ﬁrst buyer and the equilibrium price. If
e 1
  e 1
, it will be the incumbent that serves the ﬁrst buyer at a price which equals e 1
.O t h e r w i s e ,
the entrant will serve the buyer, who will pay E the price which equals e 1
.
Note that in this simple network externality model the incumbency advantage enjoyed by ﬁrm
 - which is the source of exclusion - is now due to the incumbent already having a customer base
when the game starts, whereas the entrant still needs to reach a minimum critical mass in order for
consumers to derive any utility from sponsoring it. Also the entrant needs both buyers to achieve
such a critical mass. This creates an asymmetry in the proﬁts that the two ﬁrms earn in the second
period, which translates into asymmetric competition for the ﬁrst buyer. When the incumbent’s
marginal cost disadvantage is not too strong, the incumbent ends up capturing the ﬁrst buyer,
thereby excluding the rival supplier.24
24Also in Carlton and Waldman (2002) - the variant based on network externalities - suppliers compete intensively
18Note also that in this simple model the price that the entrant is willing to oﬀer to the ﬁrst buyer
is negative, implying that below-cost pricing is not suﬃcient to exclude: the incumbent needs to
subsidise the ﬁrst buyer.25
3.4 Predation in two-sided markets
In this Section we propose a simple model of predation in a two-sided market, meant to capture
the essence of the Napp and Aberdeen Journal cases referred to in the introduction. The two
platforms  and  sell to two sides. We normalise to 1 the size of new consumers on each side. Side-1
consumers have a utility function which does not depend on the number of side-2 consumers, similar
to a hospital whose utility is unaﬀected by how many general practitioners buy the pharmaceutical
product (or to readers who do not care about advertising in their newspaper): 1 = −1 if they
buy one unit of the good from platform  = . Side-2 consumers’ utility, instead, increases with
the number of consumers on the other side of the market, similarly to the ’community market’
whose demand raises with the hospital demand in the Napp case (or to advertisers whose demand
increases with the number of readers of a newspaper). Side-2 utility function is accordingly given
by 2 = 2(1) − 2 if they buy one unit from platform  =  where 1 ∈ + is the total
number of side-1 consumers who buy from platform  at present or that bought in the past. We
assume that 2(1) is weakly increasing in 1 and that a critical mass of at least one side-1
consumer is required to achieve a positive utility from consumption: 2(0) = 0 and 2(1)  0 for
1 ≥ 1; in particular, to be consistent with the previous section, we maintain the simpliﬁcation
that 2(1)=(1 +1 )= for any 1 ≥ 1. Also, we assume that the incumbent ﬁrm  has
already a side-1 customer base 1 =1 , while the new ﬁrm  has no customer yet when the game
starts. (The old buyers are not buying any longer, but continue to use the product.) Firm  is
more cost-eﬃcient than ﬁrm  - marginal costs are respectively given by 0=     -a n di t
does not need to pay any ﬁxed cost to enter the market. Finally, apart from possible diﬀerences
in their sizes, the two platforms are homogeneous and incompatible.26 T h eg a m ei sa sf o l l o w s .
1. First period.
(a) Firms  simultaneously set prices 1
 and 1
 to side-1 buyer.
(b) Side-1 buyer decides from whom to buy.
2. Second period.
(a) Firms  simultaneously set prices 2
 and 2
 to side-2 buyer.
(b) Side-2 buyer decides from whom to buy.
3. Utilities are realised.
for the ﬁrst cohort of consumers, and such a competition may result in exclusion of the more eﬃcient entrant. In
their case, though, the asymmetry between the incumbent and the entrant is created by the former being already
active in the market for a complementary product to the network product, rather than by already having a customer
b a s ew h e nt h eg a m es t a r t s .
25If prices were restricted to be non-negative predation may still arise but there may be multiple equilibria for
any given parameter space.
26Motta and Vasconcelos (2009) study exclusion in two-sided markets in a more general context where two-sided
externalities arise and where purchasing decisions are simultaneous rather than sequential.
19The analysis is quite similar to the case of network eﬀects, and results can be summarised in
the following way.
Proposition 6 (Two-sided markets) Equilibria are as follows:
• (Entry) If 3 then both buyers buy from  the side-1 paying the price 1
 =2 − 
and the side-2 paying the price 2
 = .
• (Exclusion) If  ≥ 3 then both buyers buy from  the side-1 paying the price 1
 = −
and the side-2 buyer paying the price 2
 = .
Proof. Let us start from the second period. If the side-1 consumer bought from  then the side-2
consumer is willing to buy from  if (and only if) 2 = 2(1) − 2
 ≥ 2(1) − 2
 = 2 Since
1 =1  the side-2 consumer buys from the supplier oﬀering the lowest price, as long as such price
is below 2(1) =   (by assumption) The equilibrium prices are then 2
 = 2
 =  with ﬁrm
 supplying the side-2 buyer. If instead the side-1 consumer buys from the incumbent, then the
side-2 consumer is willing to buy from  if (and only if) 2 = 2(0)−2
 ≥ 2(1 +1)−2
 = 2
From 2(0) = 0   = 2(2) = 2(1 +1 )it follows that ﬁrm  has to oﬀer a suﬃciently large
discount in order to capture the side-2 buyer: 2
 ≤ 2
 − In equilibrium 2
 =   and 2
 =0 
with the the incumbent supplying the the side-2 consumer.
In the ﬁrst period, the side-1 consumer is willing to buy from the supplier bidding the lowest
price (her utility being unaﬀected by the number of buyers addressing a given platform). Suppliers
anticipate that who gets the side-1 buyer will also get the side-2 buyer. As shown above, the
incumbency advantage together with the production cost asymmetry make the incumbent and
ﬁrm  extract diﬀerent proﬁts from the side-2 consumer, with  earning  −  while ﬁrm 
earning  Then, the minimum prices at which they are willing to supply the side-1 consumer are
respectively:
e 1
 =2  −  
e 1
 = −
When 3 ≤  the former is lower and the incumbent captures the side-1 buyer by subsidising
her purchase.
4 Conclusions
We have presented a simple theory of predation which is based on the presence of scale economies.
The prey would need to reach a certain scale of operations (or a certain amount of proﬁts) in order
to be proﬁtable. Knowing this, the incumbent-predator would have an incentive to incur losses
on early buyers (or markets), so as to deprive the entrant of the scale (or proﬁt s )i tn e e d s ,t h u s
eliminating competition on later buyers (or markets), where the incumbent could then make high
proﬁts. Consistent with the standard description of predatory pricing, our model predicts that in
an exclusionary (predatory) equilibrium, a proﬁts a c r i ﬁce phase followed by a recoupment phase.
This equilibrium exists only if scale economies are suﬃciently important and the incumbent is not
too ineﬃcient relative to the entrant.
20We have showed that this simple mechanism applies to a number of settings: economies of scale
may exist on the supply-side or on the demand side (due to network eﬀects); markets might be
related by the existence of common costs or being two-sided; predation might aim at excluding the
prey from the market altogether, or at relegating it to a niche market.
Testing the robustness of the model by modifying a number of assumptions, we have also
obtained insights as to conditions and markets where it is more likely that predation based on this
mechanism may arise. For instance, in the case where scale economies are on the production side,
we would expect predation to exist in situation whe r ea c t u a le n t r yt a k e st i m e( t h ee n t r a n tw o u l d
ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to pre-commit to entry), where breach of contracts is more diﬃcult (due to
high transaction costs, legal costs, and buyers’ fragmentation), where downstream competition is
less ﬁerce. If scale economies are on the demand side, predation is more likely to occur when there
are important switching costs for past buyers, or where purchase is infrequent (these conditions
increase the value of the installed base of the incumbent) and where of network externalities are
important.
We have argued that in several of the recent predation cases pursued by EU antitrust agencies,
the economic rationale for predation lies on the exclusionary mechanism we have described. Our
p a p e rp r o v i d e sc o m p e t i t i o na g e n c i e sw i t han e wt h e o r yo fh a r mi np r e d a t i o nc a s e s ,a n dh e l pt h e m
understand whether the actual evidence ﬁts with the conditions under which predation might take
place. Obviously, we do not claim that our predation theory replaces or generalises the traditional
theories of predation. In some cases, predation might be more likely motivated by the desire of an
incumbent to build a reputation for aggressive behaviour, to discourage further entry, or by the
attempt of a well-funded dominant ﬁrm to make it more diﬃcult for a new ﬁrm to obtain external
funds. But in other cases, our scale-economies mechanism might ﬁt the evidence better. Further,
these diﬀerent rationales are not necessarily inconsistent with each other and might co-exist: our
theory does not exclude that an incumbent might want to deprive a particular entrant of the scale
it needs while at the same time sending a message to other potential entrants that it is ready to
do the same in the future; and being aggressive to an entrant to deprive it of the proﬁts it needs
might have the eﬀect of reducing the entrants’ assets, and therefore making it more diﬃcult for it
to obtain funds in an imperfect capital market.
For instance in what is probably the most important EC predation case, Akzo Chemie was found
guilty of predation in the market for organic peroxides, a chemical product used as a ﬂour additive
in the UK and more generally in the chemical industry.27 A c c o r d i n gt ot h eE u r o p e a nC o m m i s s i o n ,
Akzo started to prey upon its smaller rival ECS when the latter ﬁrm - previously limiting itself to
sell organic peroxides as a ﬂour additive in the UK - started to target a bigger market and made
oﬀers to BASF, one of the biggest clients of Akzo. To substantiate the allegations, the Commission
Decision reports - among other things, including some documental evidence of a predation plan -
instances of Akzo’s making below-cost oﬀers to ECS most important business clients, with serious
eﬀects on ECS:
"The value of ECS’ ﬂour additives sales in the United Kingdom had by 1984 declined
to 70 % of its 1980 sales (...). In eﬀect the "independents" and Allied Mills lost to
27Commission Decision IV/30.698 (ECS/Akzo) of 14 December 1985. Published in OJ L 374, 31 December 1985.
21AKZO UK accounted for almost one-third of its ﬂour additive business in the United
Kingdom.
The general decline in prices of ﬂour additives also involved a reduction in the margins
on the business which ECS retained. In order to remain in business (says ECS) it was
obliged to increase its bank borrowings substantially thereby incurring additional bank
charges and interest.
The lack of available funds also caused ECS to reduce its budget for research and
development and to delay modiﬁcations to its plant intended to deal with new organic
peroxide business." (para. 50)
This seems to be consistent with both the mechanism characterised in this paper (target some
key customers so as to deprive the prey of the proﬁts it needs to pay ﬁxed costs necessary to
operate, expand operations, or enter other markets) and with the ﬁnancial market predation motive
as presented by Bolton and Scharfstein (by reducing ECS’ proﬁts, it became more costly for it to
acquire funds in the ﬁnancial markets).28
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